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THE LINE BETWEEN FEDERAL AND 
STATE COURT JURISDICTION 
Leslie L. Anderson* 
CHANGES of conditions and clearer perspective have historically brought alterations to both the organization of American 
courts and the law which they apply. These alterations have oc-
curred without undue disturbance to either the federal or state 
judiciaries and with benefits to the judiciary most immediately 
affected. 
In a country having a plurality of governmental systems, it is 
possible that the laws of one will frustrate contrary rules of another 
or that there will be a Babel of confusion if several persist. There 
should be a "give" at times and change should occur according to 
developing needs. The public is not well served when touchiness 
or hubris is the basis for clinging to jurisdiction, or to a require-
ment that the law of a particular jurisdiction must apply, or even 
to forms of court organization. 
From the beginning of this nation, there have been controversies 
involving the division of jurisdiction between federal and state 
courts. Often, these controversies have centered on the diversity 
of citizenship provision of the federal constitution. Today, how-
ever, the more poignant question is whether any division of juris-
diction between the federal and state systems retains logical bases. 
Although myriad developments have relevancy with respect to 
this question, I have here focused upon two of the more important 
ones: the increasing overlap of subject matter being litigated in 
federal and state courts and the growing uniformity of standards to 
be applied in the decision-making process under recent Supreme 
Court decisions. In the light of these developments, certain pro-
posals for unifying our judicial system and the advantages to be 
gained from such changes may properly be considered. 
I. THE OVERLAP OF ] URISDIGI'ION 
Mr. Justice Brennan has stated that "the fundamental obligation 
to administer federal law rests on both [federal and state] courts,"1 
The Erie2 case imposed a similar obligation upon federal courts with 
respect to the law of the states. 
• Judge, District Court, Minneapolis, Minnesota.-Ed. 
I. N.Y.L.J., Aug. IO, 1964. 
2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
[1203] 
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It is submitted that jurisdictional distinctions based upon sub-
ject matter justify themselves only because we are historically used 
to some of them. For instance, while patents have always been the 
subject of litigation in federal courts, it is probable that few federal 
court judges have had any patent experience before their appoint-
ment to the Bench. 
Federal courts frequently deal with state and local legislation. 
State courts handle cases arising under both the federal constitution 
and acts of Congress. The Federal Employers Liability Act,3 out-
lining rights of action for injury or death of railway employees, 
and the Jones Act,4 establishing similar rights for injury or 
death of seamen, confer joint jurisdiction upon federal and state 
courts. Federal courts not located within a state, as in the District 
of Columbia, deal efficiently with subject matter identical to that 
which federal and state courts deal with separately in the various 
states. The trial courts of Canada and Australia operate similarly, 
although with some other differences. 
A single advance sheet of the Federal Supplement taken at ran-
dom by this writer contains seven diversity of citizenship cases in-
volving the following subject matters: to quiet title; for injunctive 
relief related to violation of a state fair trade act; damages for fall 
from a horse rented out by a hotel; wrongful death; damages for 
injuries suffered aboard a Brazilian airliner; fraud; and a claim 
against a tenant for breach of lease. These cases all have a ring of 
frequent familiarity to the state trial courts. 
Additional decisions in the advance sheet include six reviewing 
adverse rulings on disability benefit claims by the Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare; five for patent infringement; four 
for federal tax refunds; two antitrust cases; an admiralty case; a 
proceeding for injunctive relief against the Federal Trade Com-
mission; a proceeding against the Spanish Ministry of Commerce 
for damage to a vessel; and a proceeding for the foreclosure of 
liens against real property where the United States held a sub-
ordinate mortgage and removed the case to a federal court. 
Problems in the handling of criminal cases are in many ways 
quite identical in both court systems, and questions arise regularly 
as to whether a convicted person should be committed to a state 
or to a federal institution. A similar problem arises in the federal 
courts. One may ask why there should be both a federal prison 
and a state penitentiary. Social problems such as probation and 
3. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958). 
4. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958); Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926). 
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parole are identical in both jurisdictions, and their handling needs 
better coordination. State and federal judges depend upon FBI 
information in determining what ought to be done with law vio-
lators. Both the commission of crimes and the conduct of legitimate 
commerce are involved increasingly with interstate operations. 
Criminal laws passed by Congress may increase federal court 
burdens by placing jurisdiction in them; but the laws are no less 
reasonable subjects for state court handling. 
Federal courts have been plagued with a quantity of petty crim-
inal matters, and there have been moves to free them from this 
burden.5 A similar problem exists in the personal injury field 
where a great mass of automobile cases, no less federal than state 
in nature, has both glutted calendars every1vhere and, because of 
their general sameness, contributed an atmosphere with fertile 
potential for intellectual stagnation on the bench. Congress in-
creased the minimum amount for diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion from three thousand to ten thousand dollars and certainly 
expected thereby to lift cases out of federal courts and move them 
into state courts. Yet, if Congress really believed such cases were 
federal alone on principle, by what moral justification should it 
have passed the burden of any of them to the states? If it felt that 
the cases were too trifling for federal court attention, then it must 
have borne some attitude that state courts were inferior. Moreover, 
although the increase in the jurisdictional amount must have rid 
the United States courts of some litigation, inflation and the natural 
sagacity of lawyers to decide for themselves the unliquidated 
amounts to pray for make it highly problematical that the number 
of cases actually transferred out by the change has been particularly 
large. Federal trial courts still receive their good share of automo-
bile accident litigation. 
II. THE GROWING UNIFORM:ITY OF STANDARDS FOR DECISION-MAKING 
MAKING 
What many in recent years have viewed as the judicial mist com-
ing up from the ground relates to the line of decisions in the criminal, 
social, and political fields under the fourteenth amendment. De-
spite some opposition to these rulings, the trend continues without 
apparent change of vein. Law enforcement agencies simply must ad-
just and must be enlarged and upgraded. What remains desired 
5. Doub &: Kestenbaum, Federal Magistrates for the Trial of Petty Offenses-Need 
and Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 443 (1959). 
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is such stability of Supreme Court ruling on certain subjects that 
trial court judges, both state and federal, can adjudicate with some 
sureness in matters of serious public import. 
A. Rights of Criminal Defendants 
The fourteenth amendment has long been regarded as em-
bracing certain provisions of the first eight. Thus, even in Twining 
v. New ]ersey,6 while Mr. Justice Moody stated that "the first ten 
Amendments are not operative on the States,"7 Mr. Justice Harlan 
pointed out in his dissent that certain provisions of the first ten 
amendments do bind them.8 It would be unlawful, for example, for 
a state to abridge the freedom of speech safeguarded by the first 
amendment, or the exemption from cruel or unusual punishments, 
or the exemption from being put twice in jeopardy of life or limb 
for the same offense, or the exemption from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. However, despite the fifth amendment and the rule to 
the contrary in federal court practice, the Twining majority held 
that a state trial judge could instruct a jury in a criminal case that 
they might draw an unfavorable inference from a defendant's fail-
ure to testify in his own behalf. 
Certainly the Supreme Court has the constitutional power to 
declare that all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are within 
the fourteenth amendment's purview. Some provisions simply have 
not been esteemed of such vital concern that general thinking over 
the years would regard them as fundamental in the conduct of a 
free nation. Mr. Justice Cardozo rationalized the lack of total incor-
poration by saying that certain rights "are not of the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered liberty" and "to abolish them is not to violate a 
'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' "9 He cited a number of 
instances in which the fourteenth amendment was held to impose 
upon the states restrictions guaranteed by the Bill of Rights against 
federal encroachment. 
Cardozo thus suggests a highly subjective standard for determin-
6. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). "Principles of free speech are carried to the states only through 
the Fourteenth Amendment." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
(concurring opinion). The Court's analysis of the fourteenth amendment in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), may have been a practical one 
for the time, but it was quite restrictive. "Undoubtedly, it gave much less effect to the 
Fourteenth Amendment than some of the public men active in framing it intended, 
and disappointed many others." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96 (1908). 
7. Id. at 93. 
8. Id. at 114-27 passim. 
9. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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ing whether a provision of the first eight amendments is to be re-
garded as embodied within the fourteenth. If this be the test, one 
must understand the inner workings of the individual Justices in 
order to know the law. The Court in 1949 held that state trial 
courts could receive illegally-obtained evidence in a criminal case,10 
and Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated that what constitutes due 
process of law will be reconsidered from time to time. He pointed 
out that thirty states had rejected the federal rule requiring exclu-
sion of illegally-obtained evidence and only seventeen had accepted 
it. "We cannot brush aside the experience of States," he said, "which 
deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call 
for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by 
overriding the relevant rules of evidence."11 
Two years previously, in Adamson v. California,12 Frankfurter 
had stated that "it ought not to require argument to reject the 
notion that due process of law meant one thing in the Fifth Amend-
ment and another in the Fourteenth.''13 Mr. Justice Black dissented 
from the Adamson decision, and Justices Douglas, Murphy, and 
Rutledge concurred with his statement that, 
"I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people of the 
nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights. To hold 
that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the 
Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to 
frustrate the great design of a written Constitution."14 
With some shift of judicial personnel, what followed came 
naturally. Mapp v. Ohio16 declared that the right-to-privacy pro-
visions of the fourth amendment operate upon the states through 
the due process clause of the fourteenth and that illegally-obtained 
evidence could no longer be admitted in either state or federal 
courts against a defendant from whom it was taken. Development 
of improved methods in both the commission and the detection of 
crimes are so intenv-oven between the state and the nation that 
police methods of one government can materially affect another. 
10. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
11. Id. at 31-32. 
12. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
13. Id. at 66 (concurring opinion). 
14. Id. at 89 (dissenting opinion). 
15. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). "[N]ow .•• more than half of those [states] ••• passing 
upon it ••• have wholly or partly adopted .•. [the federal] rule." Id. at 651. See 
also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (affidavit that there was "reliable informa-
tion" from a "credible person" was held not sufficient basis to justify magistrate in 
issuing warrant for search and seizure). -
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The federal court rule repudiating the use of evidence illegally 
seized could be rendered impotent in some cases if a contrary 
rule for state courts were continued, since federal officers might 
take such evidence across the street to the state prosecutors for 
prosecution of the defendant by them. The Twining16 and A dam-
son17 cases have also been overturned,18 and states which permitted 
judges to instruct juries that they might draw unfavorable inferences 
from the failure of an accused defendant to testify may do so no 
longer. 
These rulings suggest the increasingly-knitted interrelationship 
between federal and state law enforcement and the further blend-
ing of function between state and federal courts. 
B. Civil Rights 
Growing national unity and the increase of interstate interplay 
are bound to focus more significance on the supremacy clause of 
the Constitution;19 both federal and state courts have a responsibility 
with relation to it. Laws of the United States enacted pursuant to 
the Constitution are the supreme law of the land, and the Supreme 
Court will not permit those laws to be thwarted by strategic con-
duct within the states. 
When the Supreme Court directed the admission of Negro chil-
dren to state public schools on a non-segregated basis,20 it affirmed 
what most people in most states were well prepared to accept. 
The Court affected the conduct of state government more in-
timately, however, when it held that a federal district court could 
require a county board to exercise its power to levy taxes for financ-
ing the reopening and maintenance of closed schools on a racially-
integrated basis.21 When in that case it was argued that, by customary 
procedure, the plaintiff should first have awaited a declaratory judg-
ment determination presently pending in the state courts, Mr. 
Justice Black indicated that pertinent determinations had been 
made in another case. Then, illustrating the power of the Supreme 
Court over procedures in the state courts, he said, 
"But quite independently of this, we hold that the issues here 
imperatively call for decision now .... There has been entirely 
16. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
17. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
18. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
19. U.S. CONST., art. VI. 
20. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling the "separate but 
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
21. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the 
constitutional rights . . . denied Prince Edward County Negro 
children. "22 
It was reported that approximately three thousand sit-in Negroes 
had been guilty of violations of state trespass statutes before passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The decision in Hamm v. City of 
Rock Hill23 ordered all the convictions to be vacated and pending 
prosecutions abated. For our purposes, it is not necessary at this 
point to analyze the majority's reasoning in that case. The effect 
of the holdings in the other two Civil Rights Act cases decided the 
same day24-that the more controversial features of the act were 
constitutional-would have been dulled had the Court failed to 
rule as it did. Clear conflict existed between the spirit of the 
Civil Rights Act and the adverse atmosphere that permeated the 
hold-over convictions and threats of further prosecution. 
The effects of the Hamm decision on the balance of state and 
central government relationships are, of course, another problem, and 
the impact on law enforcement within the states remains to be seen. 
Yet the decision makes it clear that the functions of federal and 
state courts in this field are quite identical-social morality is a 
matter of both federal and state concern. A major established na-
tional policy of social morality cannot exist side-by-side with a con-
flicting state practice. 
C. Political Rights 
In the 1964 Term, the Court held that it is a violation of the 
equal protection clause for one house of a state bicameral legislature 
to be elected on the basis of population and the other on the basis 
of area.211 A legislative body must be apportioned on the basis of 
population; othenvise, the votes of citizens living in the more popu-
22. Id. at 229. 
2!1. !179 U.S. !106 (1964). 
24. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (as to motel); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (as to restaurant). 
25. Reynolds v. Sims, !177 U.S. 533 (1964). See generally Reapportionment Symposium, 
6!1 MICH. L. R.Ev. 209-78 (1964). For a contrary point of view, see the 1948 statement 
by Mr. Chief Justice (then Governor) Warren: "The agricultural counties of California 
are far more important in the life of our state than the relationship their population 
bears to the entire population of the state. It is for this reason that I never have been 
in favor of restricting their representation in our state senate to a strictly population 
basis. It is the same reason that the founding fathers of our country gave balanced 
representation to the states of the Union, equal representation in one house and 
proportionate representation based upon population in the other." Time, June 26, 
1964, p. 22. 
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lous areas are diluted. Mr. Justice Harlan disagreed with the ma-
jority, saying: 
"These decisions . . . relating to elections for statewide office, 
have the effect of placing basic aspects of state political systems 
under the pervasive overlordship of the federal judiciary. . . . 
Today's holding is that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires every State to structure its 
legislature so that all the members of each house represent sub-
stantially the same number of people .... I think it demon-
strable that the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose this 
political tenet on the States or authorize this Court to do so."26 
This dissent would appear to be an appeal both for judicial 
restraint in the field of federal-state relations and for withholding 
extension of the fourteenth amendment's purview. But the voice of 
Mr. Justice Harlan alone was raised. 
!II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF SEPARATE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 
A. The Law To Be Applied 
Decisions of the Court, in broad perspective, seem to justify 
the conclusion that most restrictions upon the federal government 
set forth in the first eight amendments are now to be regarded as 
restrictions upon the states as well and that the Court will determine 
more specifically as occasion demands what restrictions or guaran-
tees will be so enforced. The tenth amendment, which reserves 
powers to the states, must conform accordingly. 
The recent cases reviewed above indicate that the Supreme Court 
is generally tolerant as to social, economic, moral, or legal prin-
ciples which are acceptable in some states, but unacceptable in a 
large proportion of them. But when these principles become more 
generally accepted as prescribing the right, just, and fair thing to do, 
notwithstanding strong disagreement by many people or even some 
state governments, or if the application of a state-adopted rule will 
probably interfere unreasonably with a rule or standard adopted 
by the central government, the Supreme Court has the power, and 
will exercise it as occasion demands, to make binding upon the 
states what is regarded as the higher standard or what constitutes 
the federal practice. 
May one not ask today, then, with the highest devotion to both 
federal and state judicial systems, what basic distinction still re-
26. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 25 at 589, 590 (dissenting opinion). 
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mains between them? Why should we retain both a federal judiciary 
and fifty separate state court organizations? Mr. Justice Harlan has 
warned that the growing feeling that the correction of social de-
ficiencies should be a judicial function holds a capacity "for serious 
mischief" ;27 but the move for amalgamation of judicial determina-
tion for the national common good and for compulsion upon the 
states nevertheless continues. The concepts of interstate and intra-
state subject matter have become of diminishing significance. So 
much can be accomplished on a national scale which the states 
otherwise would not or could not do, that the central growth has 
snowballed with general public tolerance and acquiescence. The 
Supreme Court has followed in some ways and has taken the lead-
ership in others. 
The recent cases referred to above are random examples which, 
for the most part, have been so publicized and debated that many 
a person on the street has general familiarity with them. They in-
dicate the overlap of state and federal law, the final power of the 
United States Supreme Court, and how new vistas generate the con-
cept that law as administered by courts, whether they be state or 
federal, is the same within any state. 
B. Administration and Procedure 
'Whether one favors it or not, court administration, state and 
federal, increasingly is becoming centralized everywhere in the 
United States. Mapp v. Ohio28 required uniformity as to one type 
of evidence in criminal cases. A movement is afoot for the adoption 
of a uniform code of evidence in the federal courts; if it is adopted, 
the states will surely move swiftly to adopt similar evidentiary rules. 
Rules of civil procedure in an increasing number of state courts 
approach identity to the federal rules. Coming largely from the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
various state codes have been enacted to accomplish uniformity be-
tween the states on certain subjects, both adjective and substantive. 
The American Law Institute has drafted restatements of the law 
which incline all jurisdictions toward unification of various com-
mon-law concepts. 
Because of the identity of many of their problems, the appellate 
judges of federal courts have joined state appellate judges in a single 
voluntary association within the American Bar Association; there 
27. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication-Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 
49 A.B.A.J. 943 (1963). 
28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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has been some suggestion that state and federal trial judges should 
do likewise. 
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS: A QUALITATIVE COMPARISON 
In this ·writer's observations, both the federal and the state courts 
have gone far in the field of administrative improvement and in 
the development of the quality of the law itself. State judicial sys-
tems have developed individually, and the progress of accomplish-
ment may have been slower in one state than in another and slower 
in all states than in the national courts. The larger federal system 
has developed as a whole and has certainly leavened state judiciaries 
with inspiration for their mm betterment. 
Advances have not come from judges alone. Bar associations and 
other bench- and bar-supported organizations have played leading 
roles.29 Members of the United States Supreme Court have them-
selves gone into the states and into these associations to lend their 
personal encouragement and, in a manner, to persuade that state 
and federal courts alike are in a common race together. 
A. Federal Trial Courts 
Federal district courts have acquired a substantial prestige. They 
are part of the national government, and it, of course, bears a 
greater public command than does any single state. They are also 
identified closely with the United States Supreme Court through 
the federal judicial system, and the status of the Supreme Court 
surely spreads in part to all courts that appear to bask in the sun-
light of its prestige. 
Other reasons have been advanced for the high standing of the 
federal trial bench. Its judges have always been kept limited in 
numbers, 30 and the psychology and prestige of federal office lead to 
better selection of federal judges. Law and procedural reforms by 
national associations always have placed first emphasis on the fed-
eral system since it has the broader base geographically and thus 
permits the associations to call upon their members in all states 
29. Most noteworthy, The American Judicature Society and The Institute of Judicial 
Administration, Inc. 
30. "A powerful judiciary implies a relatively small number of judges. Honorific 
motives of distinction have drawn even to the lower federal bench lawyers of the 
highest quality and thereby built up a public confidence comparable -to the feelings 
of Englishmen for their judges. Signs are not wanting that an enlargement of the 
federal judiciary does not make for maintenance of its great traditions." Frankfurter, 
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL 
L.Q. 499, 515 (1928). 
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for support. It was in the federal courts that advanced procedural 
rules were first provided; they have seeped with some rapidity into 
state court systems. 
The personal provisions for federal judges generally excel. These 
include the personnel and office facilities to spur efficiency and 
scholarly working conditions and to keep the judges conscious of 
the dignity and importance of their office. The salary level, life 
tenure, voluntary retirement at age sixty-five without reduction of 
salary, avoidance of the necessity of running in competitive elec-
tions all make the office of federal judge more attractive than that 
of the state counterpart. To these should be added as a factor of 
principal importance in the public thinking the method of selecting 
federal judges. It is far superior to that provided by most states, 
even though it could be improved by bringing the selection process 
closer to the states. 
B. State Trial Courts 
There are reasons why state courts may suffer comparatively in 
prestige.31 It has been claimed that state courts have been subject 
to political forces that have made the quality of their determinations 
too unpredictable. Personal provisions for state judges are too often 
not nearly as attractive as those for the federal judiciary, and what 
desirable provisions have been made have often come only after a 
degrading type of lobbying by the judges themselves. State judges 
31. Frankfurter gives -us a historical beginning in the diversity of citizenship field: 
"Such distrust as there was of local courts derived, not from any fear of their partiality 
to resident litigants, but of their general inadequacy for the interests of the business 
community." Id. at 520. 
Ohlinger, Limitation of Diversity Jurisdiction in Cases Affecting Foreign Corpora-
tions, 30 MrCH. L. REv. 923, 927 (1932), suggests that the feeling averse to state courts 
"comes from such legislation as that limiting the terms of state judges, making them 
subject to popular election, prohibiting comment on evidence, allowing verdicts to 
be returned by less than the entire jury, the requirement of submission to the jury 
of issues of fact which are supported by only a scintilla of evidence .... " 
"In the popular mind, at least, the federal courts are sagacious courts, in which 
political peccadillos are subordinate to an eagerness for justice; while the often mediocre 
state courts are subject to politics and a multitude of fallibilities. . . . Admittedly 
., the federal courts are the better, the more respected. Their influence upon the courts 
of the states must be considerable, both as examples of dignity in procedure and as 
checks upon occasional heretical decisions." Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Juris-
diction, 28 ILL. L. REv. 356, 369, 371 (1933). 
"[I']he administration of justice in the federal courts offers important advantages 
over that available in many states. In their formative stages many state courts were 
under the influence of their legislatures and other political forces which made the 
quality of justice somewhat unpredictable. National justice, in contrast, was adminis-
tered by judges with secure tenure and compensation .... " Moore &: Weckstein, 
Corporations arid Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction-A Supreme Court Fiction 
Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1426, 1449 (1964). 
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too generally have limited terms with the necessity of running again 
in competitive elections. Their staff facilities are usually too stinted, 
and~ even so, hydra heads appear at times to reduce further their 
efficiency. Salaries are generally far lower than federal judges re-
ceive, the age of retirement is later, and provision for retirement, 
where made, is wholly inadequate. These conditions make it diffi-
cult to inspire enough of the best and more experienced lawyers to 
leave successful law practices for lives dedicated to the bench. There 
is a need for judges of background and substantial previous legal 
experience in order to invite the confidence of all parts of the com-
munity in all its phases. 
Some of these are sad words from a member of a state trial 
bench who has found much inspiration among his own colleagues 
and in his state trial judge contacts across the country. Nor is the 
apparent prestige differential wholly justified. The National Con-
ference of State Trial Judges, inspired largely by a member of the 
United States Supreme Court,32 has done much to unify court ad-
ministrative procedures and to provide scrutiny of substantive law 
problems common to trial courts of all states. This writer is per-
sonally acquainted with numbers of state trial judges who are deeply 
dedicated to their profession and who would more than grace any 
court. But the states too generally have failed to provide the quality 
of screening and method of judicial selection that could most in-
spire the confidence of the more capable bar, the general public, 
and even state judges themselves. The tenure and method of selec-
tion actually affect the spirit of court decision. 
V. SOME PROPOSALS 
American courts and public support of them constitute one of 
the major phenomena in the preservation of our democracy. Justice 
is one of the most sacred qualities in our being. Although decisions 
of courts may not always express it, judges of high character and 
ability always strive to approximate their highest concept of justice. 
Law reformers and judicial reformers always set a goal beyond 
present accomplishment and work toward an ideal. Arthur T. Van-
derbilt's expression that judicial administrative reform is not for 
the short-winded gives ample justification now for putting up the 
damp finger to see in which direction governmental winds are blow-
ing and for looking beyond our present horizons in an effort to 
guide the trend to the necessary goal. 
32. Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark. 
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From the vantage point of the writer as a state trial court judge, 
it appears the line of demarcation between state and federal court 
jurisdiction is becoming persistently arbitrary and artificial. When, 
in one major area, the law is generally that of the state in both 
the federal and the state courts and, in another major area, the law 
to be applied in both court systems is that of the national govern-
ment, and when the trend of judicial and legal reform is to encour-
age uniformity of both judicial administration and the rules of 
substantive law, then one may well question whether there is a very 
good sense in retaining one separate federal and fifty separate state 
judicial systems. What is here suggested is a basis for substantial, 
unified, over-all judicial betterment. 
A. One Unified System 
In a rather unpublicized talk to law students, the Honorable 
W. St. John Gan\Tood, formerly a member of the Supreme Court 
of Texas, asked: 
"Should we not now be getting within at least thinking distance 
of the time when we might have ... not separate federal and 
state courts, but a single system of courts for both state and 
federal law with, if you prefer, the judiciary selected and paid 
for by both the states and the nation jointly?"88 
This in itself is no suggestion that the federal government ex-
ercise either less or more restraint in its relations with the states. We 
shall always have interests more conveniently treated as local and 
will always need state, county, and city governments. But courts are 
in a somewhat different category. Their need is always for an atmos-
phere of greater objectivity, and, to some degree, it is desirable to 
remove any feeling that the various courts represent particular gov-
ernments. Courts are not properly the representative of their govern-
ment against the people. Instead, they comprise one of the three 
major governmental departments and are to be available for fair and 
equal treatment of every person, entity, or controversy before them. 
Articles by the late Felix Frankfurter and his associates placed 
some emphasis upon the empiricism with which certain types of 
courts have come into being.84 Judicial administrative reform has 
33. 32 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1961). "If the American lawyer could only get outside the 
confines of his own system . . . he would see how absurd it really is. When we are 
able to get such a perspective on ourselves we may be able to work out some better 
solutions for these problems." GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES 79 
(1964). 
34. "Federal business seeks federal tribunals-even when state courts are available." 
Frankfurter &: Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term-1932, 47 
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been in the direction of unification. The Uniform Judiciary Article, 
as proposed for state constitutions, places the probate or surrogate 
court on the trial court level, with appellate court justices in ad-
ministrative control of the whole. The suggestion for the unifica-
tion of all courts, state and federal, into a single, unified judicial 
system departs only slightly from recent organizational accomplish-
ments or current reform proposals. The practical difficulties, created 
substantially by habit and historical prejudice, are obvious, but 
not insurmountable. Administrative and economiq~.l advantages of 
a unified court system can be considerable. 
B. Alternatives 
A unified system might be entirely federal or entirely state. If 
the former, it might be objected to as constituting too great a cen-
tralization; of course, unification into an entirely state system might 
well be considered too great a decentralization. A movement for 
either type would probably face insuperable political opposition, 
each from those who might favor the other; and both could en-
counter serious constitutional frustration. 
But alternatives for unification may be suggested. I would pro-
pose a joinder of federal and state judicial systems without elimina-
tion of either. It is submitted that this could be accomplished under 
the federal constitution without need for amendment and possibly 
under some state constitutions as presently written.35 The state and 
the federal governments would jointly provide the courts. 
There has been some feeling that opinions of the states have 
been by-passed in the determination of constitutional questions that 
seriously affect local problems. All such questions could well be 
made to flow through the proper state appellate court for an ex-
HARv. L. R.Ev. 245, 271 (1933). See also Blume &: Brown, Territorial Courts and Law-
Unifying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions, 61 MICH. L. REv. 
39 (1962). 
35. "[D]ifficulty .•. is caused by the outdated feeling that the federal courts are 
of a different system, ignoring the Supreme Court's counsel that the two sets of courts 
'are not foreign to each other ... .'" Cowen, Federal Judicial "Interference" With the 
Finality of State Court Proceedings, 50 GEO. L.J. 733, 752 (1962). "It is not essential to 
a federal government to have federal courts. No other English speaking union has 
such a system." Frankfurter, supra note 30, at 515. 
"Roger Sherman of Connecticut ... had written: 'The Constitution does not make 
it necessary that any inferior tribunals should be instituted, but it may be done, if 
found necessary ... .'" Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 65 (1923). 
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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pression of state attitude, subject to further appeal in proper cases 
to another appellate tribunal. The state appellate courts could settle 
state law questions that are presently decided by federal courts with-
out state court precedent. Existing procedures whereby a federal 
trial court may occasionally review proceedings in a state appellate 
court are both belittling and offensive to a degree; they ought to be 
eliminated. The level of functions in both the state appellate courts 
and the federal circuit courts could be raised, and a better buffer 
could be developed against the flood of matters approaching the 
United States Supreme Court. 
There would have to be a new federal judiciary act that would 
bring states under its purview as they in tum raise their court 
standards to a specified level. The act would be supplemented by 
substantial use of the Supreme Court rule-making power. All of 
the litigation and the administrative duties of the state and federal 
courts might well be placed under management generally by the 
administrative office of the United States courts, and present state 
court administration could be unified on a national basis under the 
director of that office. This would promote efficiency and economy. 
One state court administrator of today could probably handle the 
work of a number of states. 
While the federal constitution would not have to be amended 
to accomplish this end, developments in the study of judicial selec-
tion certainly indicate that article II, section 2, which deals with 
the appointive power, ought to be amended at some time in order 
to bring the selection of trial judges nearer to the states and to 
otherwise improve the method of judicial selection. 
Individual states, of course, are reluctant to accept governmental 
centralization. A unification program would have to win their 
gradual support. If we were here considering federal aid in its usual 
sense, we would invite the usual political hurdles even though the 
concept of such aid is not new and has in other fields ultimately re-
sulted in general, whole-hearted state acquiescence. The suggestion 
here is simply that the federal government do its part in the financing 
and administration of what has become increasingly a field of na-
tional government participation, and that the states accept the ad-
vantages that would flow from the unification. 
The change proposed is largely an administrative one. Decisions 
would continue to be made within the states subject to final de-
termination by the Supreme Court of the law to be applied. What 
states would give up would be small and would be far outweighed 
by the advantages of the administrative transformation. The states 
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would realize substantial economic benefits in addition to an im-
p 
proved judiciary. 
It was initially expressed, when the judiciary article of the Con-
stitution was being formulated, that, after the state courts had been 
placed on a sound footing, all litigation would be taken over by the 
states. 36 State courts have been improved and developed immeasur-
ably. The winds of government, however, have blown in the op-
posite direction. . 
The unifying reform suggested above, which now looks so nat-
urally possible, should require state court administration to be 
raised to a specified level before a state could have the advantage 
of the program. Being quantitatively statistical is not enough. The 
support of the practicing bar, the legislatures, and the general pub-
lic, as well as leavening among judges themselves, are requisite. The 
possible rewards to a democracy and for those who acknowledge 
the sacredness of the concept of justice for their fellow man are 
great. 
36. "James Madison had said: 'It will be also in the power of Congress to vest this 
power in the State Courts both inferior and superior. This they will do, when they find 
the tribunals of the States established on a good footing.'" Warren, supra note 35, at 66. 
